/* SSL support via OpenSSL library.
- Copyright (C) 2000-2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
+ 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Originally contributed by Christian Fraenkel.
This file is part of GNU Wget.
GNU Wget is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
GNU Wget is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-along with Wget; if not, write to the Free Software
-Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+along with Wget. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-In addition, as a special exception, the Free Software Foundation
-gives permission to link the code of its release of Wget with the
-OpenSSL project's "OpenSSL" library (or with modified versions of it
-that use the same license as the "OpenSSL" library), and distribute
-the linked executables. You must obey the GNU General Public License
-in all respects for all of the code used other than "OpenSSL". If you
-modify this file, you may extend this exception to your version of the
-file, but you are not obligated to do so. If you do not wish to do
-so, delete this exception statement from your version. */
+Additional permission under GNU GPL version 3 section 7
-#include <config.h>
+If you modify this program, or any covered work, by linking or
+combining it with the OpenSSL project's OpenSSL library (or a
+modified version of that library), containing parts covered by the
+terms of the OpenSSL or SSLeay licenses, the Free Software Foundation
+grants you additional permission to convey the resulting work.
+Corresponding Source for a non-source form of such a combination
+shall include the source code for the parts of OpenSSL used as well
+as that of the covered work. */
+
+#include "wget.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-# include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
-# include <string.h>
-#else
-# include <strings.h>
-#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "wget.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "url.h"
#include "ssl.h"
-#ifndef errno
-extern int errno;
+#ifdef WINDOWS
+# include <w32sock.h>
#endif
/* Application-wide SSL context. This is common to all SSL
connections. */
-SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
+static SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
/* Initialize the SSL's PRNG using various methods. */
while (RAND_status () == 0 && maxrand-- > 0)
{
- unsigned char rnd = random_number (256);
- RAND_seed (&rnd, sizeof (rnd));
+ unsigned char rnd = random_number (256);
+ RAND_seed (&rnd, sizeof (rnd));
}
}
#endif
}
-/* #### Someone should audit and document this. */
-
-static int
-verify_callback (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- char buf[256];
- /* #### Why are we not using the result of this call? */
- X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (ctx->current_cert),
- buf, sizeof (buf));
- if (ok == 0)
- {
- switch (ctx->error)
- {
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
- /* This mean the CERT is not valid !!! */
- ok = 0;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- /* Unsure if we should handle that this way */
- ok = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- return ok;
-}
-
/* Print errors in the OpenSSL error stack. */
static void
-print_errors (void)
+print_errors (void)
{
- unsigned long curerr = 0;
- while ((curerr = ERR_get_error ()) != 0)
- logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "OpenSSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string (curerr, NULL));
+ unsigned long err;
+ while ((err = ERR_get_error ()) != 0)
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "OpenSSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string (err, NULL));
}
/* Convert keyfile type as used by options.h to a type as accepted by
/* Create an SSL Context and set default paths etc. Called the first
time an HTTP download is attempted.
- Returns 0 on success, non-zero otherwise. */
+ Returns true on success, false otherwise. */
-int
-ssl_init ()
+bool
+ssl_init (void)
{
- SSL_METHOD *meth;
+ SSL_METHOD const *meth;
if (ssl_ctx)
/* The SSL has already been initialized. */
- return 1;
+ return true;
/* Init the PRNG. If that fails, bail out. */
init_prng ();
if (RAND_status () != 1)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
- _("Could not seed PRNG; consider using --random-file.\n"));
+ _("Could not seed PRNG; consider using --random-file.\n"));
goto error;
}
case secure_protocol_auto:
meth = SSLv23_client_method ();
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
case secure_protocol_sslv2:
meth = SSLv2_client_method ();
break;
+#endif
case secure_protocol_sslv3:
meth = SSLv3_client_method ();
break;
+ case secure_protocol_pfs:
case secure_protocol_tlsv1:
meth = TLSv1_client_method ();
break;
abort ();
}
- ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new (meth);
+ /* The type cast below accommodates older OpenSSL versions (0.9.8)
+ where SSL_CTX_new() is declared without a "const" argument. */
+ ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new ((SSL_METHOD *)meth);
if (!ssl_ctx)
goto error;
+ /* OpenSSL ciphers: https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html
+ * Since we want a good protection, we also use HIGH (that excludes MD4 ciphers and some more)
+ */
+ if (opt.secure_protocol == secure_protocol_pfs)
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list (ssl_ctx, "HIGH:MEDIUM:!RC4:!SRP:!PSK:!RSA:!aNULL@STRENGTH");
+
SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths (ssl_ctx);
SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations (ssl_ctx, opt.ca_cert, opt.ca_directory);
- SSL_CTX_set_verify (ssl_ctx,
- opt.check_cert ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
- verify_callback);
+
+ /* SSL_VERIFY_NONE instructs OpenSSL not to abort SSL_connect if the
+ certificate is invalid. We verify the certificate separately in
+ ssl_check_certificate, which provides much better diagnostics
+ than examining the error stack after a failed SSL_connect. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify (ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
+
+ /* Use the private key from the cert file unless otherwise specified. */
+ if (opt.cert_file && !opt.private_key)
+ {
+ opt.private_key = opt.cert_file;
+ opt.private_key_type = opt.cert_type;
+ }
if (opt.cert_file)
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file (ssl_ctx, opt.cert_file,
- key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.cert_type))
- != 1)
+ key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.cert_type))
+ != 1)
goto error;
if (opt.private_key)
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file (ssl_ctx, opt.private_key,
- key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.private_key_type))
- != 1)
+ key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.private_key_type))
+ != 1)
goto error;
- return 1;
+ /* Since fd_write unconditionally assumes partial writes (and
+ handles them correctly), allow them in OpenSSL. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode (ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE);
+
+ /* The OpenSSL library can handle renegotiations automatically, so
+ tell it to do so. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode (ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
+ return true;
error:
if (ssl_ctx)
SSL_CTX_free (ssl_ctx);
print_errors ();
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static int
-openssl_read (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *ctx)
+struct openssl_transport_context
+{
+ SSL *conn; /* SSL connection handle */
+ char *last_error; /* last error printed with openssl_errstr */
+};
+
+struct openssl_read_args
{
+ int fd;
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx;
+ char *buf;
+ int bufsize;
+ int retval;
+};
+
+static void openssl_read_callback(void *arg)
+{
+ struct openssl_read_args *args = (struct openssl_read_args *) arg;
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = args->ctx;
+ SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
+ char *buf = args->buf;
+ int bufsize = args->bufsize;
int ret;
- SSL *ssl = (SSL *) ctx;
+
do
- ret = SSL_read (ssl, buf, bufsize);
- while (ret == -1
- && SSL_get_error (ssl, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
- && errno == EINTR);
- return ret;
+ ret = SSL_read (conn, buf, bufsize);
+ while (ret == -1 && SSL_get_error (conn, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+ && errno == EINTR);
+ args->retval = ret;
+}
+
+static int
+openssl_read (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *arg)
+{
+ struct openssl_read_args args;
+ args.fd = fd;
+ args.buf = buf;
+ args.bufsize = bufsize;
+ args.ctx = (struct openssl_transport_context*) arg;
+
+ if (run_with_timeout(opt.read_timeout, openssl_read_callback, &args)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return args.retval;
}
static int
-openssl_write (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *ctx)
+openssl_write (int fd _GL_UNUSED, char *buf, int bufsize, void *arg)
{
int ret = 0;
- SSL *ssl = (SSL *) ctx;
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
+ SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
do
- ret = SSL_write (ssl, buf, bufsize);
+ ret = SSL_write (conn, buf, bufsize);
while (ret == -1
- && SSL_get_error (ssl, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
- && errno == EINTR);
+ && SSL_get_error (conn, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+ && errno == EINTR);
return ret;
}
static int
-openssl_poll (int fd, double timeout, int wait_for, void *ctx)
+openssl_poll (int fd, double timeout, int wait_for, void *arg)
{
- SSL *ssl = (SSL *) ctx;
- if (timeout == 0)
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
+ SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
+ if (SSL_pending (conn))
return 1;
- if (SSL_pending (ssl))
+ if (timeout == 0)
return 1;
return select_fd (fd, timeout, wait_for);
}
static int
-openssl_peek (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *ctx)
+openssl_peek (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *arg)
{
int ret;
- SSL *ssl = (SSL *) ctx;
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
+ SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
+ if (! openssl_poll (fd, 0.0, WAIT_FOR_READ, arg))
+ return 0;
do
- ret = SSL_peek (ssl, buf, bufsize);
+ ret = SSL_peek (conn, buf, bufsize);
while (ret == -1
- && SSL_get_error (ssl, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
- && errno == EINTR);
+ && SSL_get_error (conn, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+ && errno == EINTR);
return ret;
}
+static const char *
+openssl_errstr (int fd _GL_UNUSED, void *arg)
+{
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
+ unsigned long errcode;
+ char *errmsg = NULL;
+ int msglen = 0;
+
+ /* If there are no SSL-specific errors, just return NULL. */
+ if ((errcode = ERR_get_error ()) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Get rid of previous contents of ctx->last_error, if any. */
+ xfree_null (ctx->last_error);
+
+ /* Iterate over OpenSSL's error stack and accumulate errors in the
+ last_error buffer, separated by "; ". This is better than using
+ a static buffer, which *always* takes up space (and has to be
+ large, to fit more than one error message), whereas these
+ allocations are only performed when there is an actual error. */
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ const char *str = ERR_error_string (errcode, NULL);
+ int len = strlen (str);
+
+ /* Allocate space for the existing message, plus two more chars
+ for the "; " separator and one for the terminating \0. */
+ errmsg = xrealloc (errmsg, msglen + len + 2 + 1);
+ memcpy (errmsg + msglen, str, len);
+ msglen += len;
+
+ /* Get next error and bail out if there are no more. */
+ errcode = ERR_get_error ();
+ if (errcode == 0)
+ break;
+
+ errmsg[msglen++] = ';';
+ errmsg[msglen++] = ' ';
+ }
+ errmsg[msglen] = '\0';
+
+ /* Store the error in ctx->last_error where openssl_close will
+ eventually find it and free it. */
+ ctx->last_error = errmsg;
+
+ return errmsg;
+}
+
static void
-openssl_close (int fd, void *ctx)
+openssl_close (int fd, void *arg)
{
- SSL *ssl = (SSL *) ctx;
- SSL_shutdown (ssl);
- SSL_free (ssl);
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
+ SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
+
+ SSL_shutdown (conn);
+ SSL_free (conn);
+ xfree_null (ctx->last_error);
+ xfree (ctx);
-#ifdef WINDOWS
- closesocket (fd);
-#else
close (fd);
-#endif
- DEBUGP (("Closed %d/SSL 0x%0lx\n", fd, (unsigned long) ssl));
+ DEBUGP (("Closed %d/SSL 0x%0*lx\n", fd, PTR_FORMAT (conn)));
}
-/* Sets up a SSL structure and performs the handshake on fd. The
- resulting SSL structure is registered with the file descriptor FD
- using fd_register_transport. That way subsequent calls to xread,
- xwrite, etc., will use the appropriate SSL functions.
+/* openssl_transport is the singleton that describes the SSL transport
+ methods provided by this file. */
- Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */
+static struct transport_implementation openssl_transport = {
+ openssl_read, openssl_write, openssl_poll,
+ openssl_peek, openssl_errstr, openssl_close
+};
-int
-ssl_connect (int fd)
+struct scwt_context
{
SSL *ssl;
+ int result;
+};
+
+static void
+ssl_connect_with_timeout_callback(void *arg)
+{
+ struct scwt_context *ctx = (struct scwt_context *)arg;
+ ctx->result = SSL_connect(ctx->ssl);
+}
+
+/* Perform the SSL handshake on file descriptor FD, which is assumed
+ to be connected to an SSL server. The SSL handle provided by
+ OpenSSL is registered with the file descriptor FD using
+ fd_register_transport, so that subsequent calls to fd_read,
+ fd_write, etc., will use the corresponding SSL functions.
+
+ Returns true on success, false on failure. */
+
+bool
+ssl_connect_wget (int fd, const char *hostname)
+{
+ SSL *conn;
+ struct scwt_context scwt_ctx;
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx;
+
+ DEBUGP (("Initiating SSL handshake.\n"));
assert (ssl_ctx != NULL);
- ssl = SSL_new (ssl_ctx);
- if (!ssl)
- goto err;
- if (!SSL_set_fd (ssl, fd))
- goto err;
- SSL_set_connect_state (ssl);
- if (SSL_connect (ssl) <= 0 || ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK)
- goto err;
-
- /* Register FD with Wget's transport layer, i.e. arrange that
- SSL-enabled functions are used for reading, writing, and polling.
- That way the rest of Wget can keep using fd_read, fd_write, and
- friends and not care what happens underneath. */
- fd_register_transport (fd, openssl_read, openssl_write, openssl_poll,
- openssl_peek, openssl_close, ssl);
- DEBUGP (("Connected %d to SSL 0x%0*lx\n", fd, 2 * sizeof (void *),
- (unsigned long) ssl));
- return 1;
-
- err:
+ conn = SSL_new (ssl_ctx);
+ if (!conn)
+ goto error;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+ /* If the SSL library was build with support for ServerNameIndication
+ then use it whenever we have a hostname. If not, don't, ever. */
+ if (! is_valid_ip_address (hostname))
+ {
+ if (! SSL_set_tlsext_host_name (conn, hostname))
+ {
+ DEBUGP (("Failed to set TLS server-name indication."));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef FD_TO_SOCKET
+# define FD_TO_SOCKET(X) (X)
+#endif
+ if (!SSL_set_fd (conn, FD_TO_SOCKET (fd)))
+ goto error;
+ SSL_set_connect_state (conn);
+
+ scwt_ctx.ssl = conn;
+ if (run_with_timeout(opt.read_timeout, ssl_connect_with_timeout_callback,
+ &scwt_ctx)) {
+ DEBUGP (("SSL handshake timed out.\n"));
+ goto timeout;
+ }
+ if (scwt_ctx.result <= 0 || conn->state != SSL_ST_OK)
+ goto error;
+
+ ctx = xnew0 (struct openssl_transport_context);
+ ctx->conn = conn;
+
+ /* Register FD with Wget's transport layer, i.e. arrange that our
+ functions are used for reading, writing, and polling. */
+ fd_register_transport (fd, &openssl_transport, ctx);
+ DEBUGP (("Handshake successful; connected socket %d to SSL handle 0x%0*lx\n",
+ fd, PTR_FORMAT (conn)));
+ return true;
+
+ error:
+ DEBUGP (("SSL handshake failed.\n"));
print_errors ();
- if (ssl)
- SSL_free (ssl);
- return 0;
+ timeout:
+ if (conn)
+ SSL_free (conn);
+ return false;
+}
+
+#define ASTERISK_EXCLUDES_DOT /* mandated by rfc2818 */
+
+/* Return true is STRING (case-insensitively) matches PATTERN, false
+ otherwise. The recognized wildcard character is "*", which matches
+ any character in STRING except ".". Any number of the "*" wildcard
+ may be present in the pattern.
+
+ This is used to match of hosts as indicated in rfc2818: "Names may
+ contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any
+ single domain name component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com
+ matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but
+ not bar.com [or foo.bar.com]."
+
+ If the pattern contain no wildcards, pattern_match(a, b) is
+ equivalent to !strcasecmp(a, b). */
+
+static bool
+pattern_match (const char *pattern, const char *string)
+{
+ const char *p = pattern, *n = string;
+ char c;
+ for (; (c = c_tolower (*p++)) != '\0'; n++)
+ if (c == '*')
+ {
+ for (c = c_tolower (*p); c == '*'; c = c_tolower (*++p))
+ ;
+ for (; *n != '\0'; n++)
+ if (c_tolower (*n) == c && pattern_match (p, n))
+ return true;
+#ifdef ASTERISK_EXCLUDES_DOT
+ else if (*n == '.')
+ return false;
+#endif
+ return c == '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (c != c_tolower (*n))
+ return false;
+ }
+ return *n == '\0';
}
+
+/* Verify the validity of the certificate presented by the server.
+ Also check that the "common name" of the server, as presented by
+ its certificate, corresponds to HOST. (HOST typically comes from
+ the URL and is what the user thinks he's connecting to.)
+
+ This assumes that ssl_connect_wget has successfully finished, i.e. that
+ the SSL handshake has been performed and that FD is connected to an
+ SSL handle.
+
+ If opt.check_cert is true (the default), this returns 1 if the
+ certificate is valid, 0 otherwise. If opt.check_cert is 0, the
+ function always returns 1, but should still be called because it
+ warns the user about any problems with the certificate. */
+
+bool
+ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *subjectAltNames;
+ char common_name[256];
+ long vresult;
+ bool success = true;
+ bool alt_name_checked = false;
+
+ /* If the user has specified --no-check-cert, we still want to warn
+ him about problems with the server's certificate. */
+ const char *severity = opt.check_cert ? _("ERROR") : _("WARNING");
+
+ struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = fd_transport_context (fd);
+ SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
+ assert (conn != NULL);
+
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (conn);
+ if (!cert)
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s: No certificate presented by %s.\n"),
+ severity, quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host));
+ success = false;
+ goto no_cert; /* must bail out since CERT is NULL */
+ }
+
+ IF_DEBUG
+ {
+ char *subject = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (cert), 0, 0);
+ char *issuer = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (cert), 0, 0);
+ DEBUGP (("certificate:\n subject: %s\n issuer: %s\n",
+ quotearg_n_style (0, escape_quoting_style, subject),
+ quotearg_n_style (1, escape_quoting_style, issuer)));
+ OPENSSL_free (subject);
+ OPENSSL_free (issuer);
+ }
+
+ vresult = SSL_get_verify_result (conn);
+ if (vresult != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ char *issuer = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (cert), 0, 0);
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _("%s: cannot verify %s's certificate, issued by %s:\n"),
+ severity, quotearg_n_style (0, escape_quoting_style, host),
+ quote_n (1, issuer));
+ /* Try to print more user-friendly (and translated) messages for
+ the frequent verification errors. */
+ switch (vresult)
+ {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _(" Unable to locally verify the issuer's authority.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _(" Self-signed certificate encountered.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _(" Issued certificate not yet valid.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _(" Issued certificate has expired.\n"));
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* For the less frequent error strings, simply provide the
+ OpenSSL error message. */
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, " %s\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string (vresult));
+ }
+ success = false;
+ /* Fall through, so that the user is warned about *all* issues
+ with the cert (important with --no-check-certificate.) */
+ }
+
+ /* Check that HOST matches the common name in the certificate.
+ #### The following remains to be done:
+
+ - When matching against common names, it should loop over all
+ common names and choose the most specific one, i.e. the last
+ one, not the first one, which the current code picks.
+
+ - Ensure that ASN1 strings from the certificate are encoded as
+ UTF-8 which can be meaningfully compared to HOST. */
+
+ subjectAltNames = X509_get_ext_d2i (cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (subjectAltNames)
+ {
+ /* Test subject alternative names */
+
+ /* Do we want to check for dNSNAmes or ipAddresses (see RFC 2818)?
+ * Signal it by host_in_octet_string. */
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *host_in_octet_string = a2i_IPADDRESS (host);
+
+ int numaltnames = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num (subjectAltNames);
+ int i;
+ for (i=0; i < numaltnames; i++)
+ {
+ const GENERAL_NAME *name =
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_value (subjectAltNames, i);
+ if (name)
+ {
+ if (host_in_octet_string)
+ {
+ if (name->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ {
+ /* Check for ipAddress */
+ /* TODO: Should we convert between IPv4-mapped IPv6
+ * addresses and IPv4 addresses? */
+ alt_name_checked = true;
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_cmp (host_in_octet_string,
+ name->d.iPAddress))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (name->type == GEN_DNS)
+ {
+ /* dNSName should be IA5String (i.e. ASCII), however who
+ * does trust CA? Convert it into UTF-8 for sure. */
+ unsigned char *name_in_utf8 = NULL;
+
+ /* Check for dNSName */
+ alt_name_checked = true;
+
+ if (0 <= ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&name_in_utf8, name->d.dNSName))
+ {
+ /* Compare and check for NULL attack in ASN1_STRING */
+ if (pattern_match ((char *)name_in_utf8, host) &&
+ (strlen ((char *)name_in_utf8) ==
+ (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length (name->d.dNSName)))
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free (name_in_utf8);
+ break;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free (name_in_utf8);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_free (subjectAltNames);
+ if (host_in_octet_string)
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(host_in_octet_string);
+
+ if (alt_name_checked == true && i >= numaltnames)
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
+ _("%s: no certificate subject alternative name matches\n"
+ "\trequested host name %s.\n"),
+ severity, quote_n (1, host));
+ success = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (alt_name_checked == false)
+ {
+ /* Test commomName */
+ X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+ common_name[0] = '\0';
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, common_name,
+ sizeof (common_name));
+
+ if (!pattern_match (common_name, host))
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
+ %s: certificate common name %s doesn't match requested host name %s.\n"),
+ severity, quote_n (0, common_name), quote_n (1, host));
+ success = false;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it
+ * differs from common_name's length, then there is a \0
+ * before the string terminates. This can be an instance of a
+ * null-prefix attack.
+ *
+ * https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
+ * */
+
+ int i = -1, j;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry;
+ ASN1_STRING *sdata;
+
+ if (xname) {
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i);
+ if (j == -1) break;
+ i = j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i);
+ sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry);
+ if (strlen (common_name) != (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length (sdata))
+ {
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
+ %s: certificate common name is invalid (contains a NUL character).\n\
+ This may be an indication that the host is not who it claims to be\n\
+ (that is, it is not the real %s).\n"),
+ severity, quote (host));
+ success = false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ if (success)
+ DEBUGP (("X509 certificate successfully verified and matches host %s\n",
+ quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host)));
+ X509_free (cert);
+
+ no_cert:
+ if (opt.check_cert && !success)
+ logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
+To connect to %s insecurely, use `--no-check-certificate'.\n"),
+ quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host));
+
+ /* Allow --no-check-cert to disable certificate checking. */
+ return opt.check_cert ? success : true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * vim: tabstop=2 shiftwidth=2 softtabstop=2
+ */
projects / wget / blobdiff