From: Joao Ferreira Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 07:44:22 +0000 (-0700) Subject: Detect NULs in common name. X-Git-Tag: v1.13~281 X-Git-Url: http://sjero.net/git/?p=wget;a=commitdiff_plain;h=61a4b1f77a3412dbd9a3864d8422addf94459fd1 Detect NULs in common name. --- diff --git a/src/ChangeLog b/src/ChangeLog index 983657ec..9d3a64d4 100644 --- a/src/ChangeLog +++ b/src/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ +2009-08-19 Joao Ferreira + + * openssl.c (ssl_check_certificate): Detect embedded NUL + characters in the SSL certificate common name. + 2009-08-17 Tony Lewis * http.c (gethttp): Ensure that we parse Content-Length before we diff --git a/src/openssl.c b/src/openssl.c index a6e77adc..dd3a62a4 100644 --- a/src/openssl.c +++ b/src/openssl.c @@ -569,9 +569,35 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host) - Ensure that ASN1 strings from the certificate are encoded as UTF-8 which can be meaningfully compared to HOST. */ + X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(cert); common_name[0] = '\0'; - X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert), + X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof (common_name)); + + /* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it differs from + * common_name's length, then there is a \0 before the string terminates. + * This can be an instance of a null-prefix attack [0]. + * + * [0] https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike + * */ + + int i=-1,j; + if(xname) { + for(;(j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i))!=-1;i=j); + } + + X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i); + ASN1_STRING *sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry); + + if (strlen(common_name) != ASN1_STRING_length(sdata)) + { + logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\ +%s: certificate common name is invalid. It is possible that someone is \ +eavesdropping on you (man-in-the-middle attack)!\n"), + severity); + success = false; + } + if (!pattern_match (common_name, host)) { logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\