X-Git-Url: http://sjero.net/git/?p=wget;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fopenssl.c;h=de335c086a021aec355014f7a7aa25b1bbaece93;hp=c33b4ad664b084453289d90138863e01456815ea;hb=57c9e17e6cfef9bc0e8ab9fa8edf9d131a233e57;hpb=bc8f473272ec29b0d0021dbcab6ac561ddc6249d

diff --git a/src/openssl.c b/src/openssl.c
index c33b4ad6..de335c08 100644
--- a/src/openssl.c
+++ b/src/openssl.c
@@ -210,6 +210,13 @@ ssl_init ()
      than examining the error stack after a failed SSL_connect.  */
   SSL_CTX_set_verify (ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
 
+  /* Use the private key from the cert file unless otherwise specified. */
+  if (opt.cert_file && !opt.private_key)
+    {
+      opt.private_key = opt.cert_file;
+      opt.private_key_type = opt.cert_type;
+    }
+
   if (opt.cert_file)
     if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file (ssl_ctx, opt.cert_file,
                                       key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.cert_type))
@@ -383,7 +390,7 @@ static struct transport_implementation openssl_transport = {
    Returns true on success, false on failure.  */
 
 bool
-ssl_connect (int fd) 
+ssl_connect_wget (int fd) 
 {
   SSL *conn;
   struct openssl_transport_context *ctx;
@@ -466,7 +473,7 @@ pattern_match (const char *pattern, const char *string)
    its certificate, corresponds to HOST.  (HOST typically comes from
    the URL and is what the user thinks he's connecting to.)
 
-   This assumes that ssl_connect has successfully finished, i.e. that
+   This assumes that ssl_connect_wget has successfully finished, i.e. that
    the SSL handshake has been performed and that FD is connected to an
    SSL handle.
 
@@ -495,7 +502,7 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
   if (!cert)
     {
       logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s: No certificate presented by %s.\n"),
-                 severity, escnonprint (host));
+                 severity, quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host));
       success = false;
       goto no_cert;             /* must bail out since CERT is NULL */
     }
@@ -505,7 +512,8 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
       char *subject = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (cert), 0, 0);
       char *issuer = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (cert), 0, 0);
       DEBUGP (("certificate:\n  subject: %s\n  issuer:  %s\n",
-               escnonprint (subject), escnonprint (issuer)));
+               quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, subject), 
+               quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, issuer)));
       OPENSSL_free (subject);
       OPENSSL_free (issuer);
     }
@@ -515,8 +523,9 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
     {
       char *issuer = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (cert), 0, 0);
       logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
-                 _("%s: cannot verify %s's certificate, issued by `%s':\n"),
-                 severity, escnonprint (host), escnonprint (issuer));
+                 _("%s: cannot verify %s's certificate, issued by %s:\n"),
+                 severity, quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host), 
+                 quote (issuer));
       /* Try to print more user-friendly (and translated) messages for
          the frequent verification errors.  */
       switch (vresult)
@@ -560,27 +569,64 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
      - Ensure that ASN1 strings from the certificate are encoded as
        UTF-8 which can be meaningfully compared to HOST.  */
 
+  X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
   common_name[0] = '\0';
-  X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert),
-                             NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof (common_name));
+  X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, common_name,
+                             sizeof (common_name));
+
   if (!pattern_match (common_name, host))
     {
       logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
-%s: certificate common name `%s' doesn't match requested host name `%s'.\n"),
-                 severity, escnonprint (common_name), escnonprint (host));
+%s: certificate common name %s doesn't match requested host name %s.\n"),
+                 severity, quote (common_name), quote (host));
       success = false;
     }
+  else
+    {
+      /* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it differs from
+       * common_name's length, then there is a \0 before the string terminates.
+       * This can be an instance of a null-prefix attack.
+       *
+       * https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
+       * */
+
+      int i = -1, j;
+      X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry;
+      ASN1_STRING *sdata;
+
+      if (xname) {
+        for (;;)
+          {
+            j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i);
+            if (j == -1) break;
+            i = j;
+          }
+      }
+
+      xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i);
+      sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry);
+      if (strlen (common_name) != ASN1_STRING_length (sdata)) 
+        {
+          logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
+%s: certificate common name is invalid (contains a NUL character).\n\
+This may be an indication that the host is not who it claims to be\n\
+(that is, it is not the real %s).\n"),
+                     severity, quote (host));
+          success = false;
+        }
+    }
+  
 
   if (success)
     DEBUGP (("X509 certificate successfully verified and matches host %s\n",
-             escnonprint (host)));
+             quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host)));
   X509_free (cert);
 
  no_cert:
   if (opt.check_cert && !success)
     logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
 To connect to %s insecurely, use `--no-check-certificate'.\n"),
-               escnonprint (host));
+               quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, host));
 
   /* Allow --no-check-cert to disable certificate checking. */
   return opt.check_cert ? success : true;