X-Git-Url: http://sjero.net/git/?p=wget;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fopenssl.c;h=dd3a62a4ee0cf594f97cc35655be548e259dd3c4;hp=f5239ede6e8f0b478a81625261a805165e13403c;hb=61a4b1f77a3412dbd9a3864d8422addf94459fd1;hpb=8e9648a972b88fa6eb2293383bd281c6021394d2

diff --git a/src/openssl.c b/src/openssl.c
index f5239ede..dd3a62a4 100644
--- a/src/openssl.c
+++ b/src/openssl.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static struct transport_implementation openssl_transport = {
    Returns true on success, false on failure.  */
 
 bool
-ssl_connect (int fd) 
+ssl_connect_wget (int fd) 
 {
   SSL *conn;
   struct openssl_transport_context *ctx;
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ pattern_match (const char *pattern, const char *string)
    its certificate, corresponds to HOST.  (HOST typically comes from
    the URL and is what the user thinks he's connecting to.)
 
-   This assumes that ssl_connect has successfully finished, i.e. that
+   This assumes that ssl_connect_wget has successfully finished, i.e. that
    the SSL handshake has been performed and that FD is connected to an
    SSL handle.
 
@@ -569,9 +569,35 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
      - Ensure that ASN1 strings from the certificate are encoded as
        UTF-8 which can be meaningfully compared to HOST.  */
 
+  X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
   common_name[0] = '\0';
-  X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert),
+  X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname,
                              NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof (common_name));
+
+  /* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it differs from
+   * common_name's length, then there is a \0 before the string terminates.
+   * This can be an instance of a null-prefix attack [0].
+   *
+   * [0] https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
+   * */
+
+  int i=-1,j;
+  if(xname) {
+	  for(;(j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i))!=-1;i=j);
+  }
+
+  X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i);
+  ASN1_STRING *sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry);
+
+  if (strlen(common_name) != ASN1_STRING_length(sdata)) 
+    {
+      logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
+%s: certificate common name is invalid. It is possible that someone is \
+eavesdropping on you (man-in-the-middle attack)!\n"),
+                 severity);
+      success = false;
+    }
+
   if (!pattern_match (common_name, host))
     {
       logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\